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The Income and Consumption Effects of
COVID-19 and the Role of Public Policy*






We provide empirical evidence on the labour market impacts of COVID-19
in the UK and assess the effectiveness of mitigation policies. We estimate the
relationship between employment outcomes and occupational and industrial
characteristics and assess the effects on consumption. Seventy per cent of
households in the bottom fifth of the earnings distribution hold insufficient
assets to maintain current spending for more than one week. We compare the
effectiveness of the UK’s Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme and of Economic
Impact Payments in the US. The EIPs are more effective at mitigating
consumption reductions as they have full coverage, depend on household
structure and are higher for low-income workers.
I. Introduction
COVID-19 has created new challenges for public policy. Measures introduced
to curtail the spread of the virus come at potentially substantial economic
cost. Importantly, many of these costs have been borne unequally, falling
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disproportionately on low-income and younger workers. What explains the
inequality in labour market impacts? Given assortative partnering, how well
can households self-insure against the risks? And to what extent are the
most affected households able to maintain expenditure following any negative
income shocks? The answers to these questions are crucial for designing and
assessing policies to mitigate the economic costs of the pandemic.
In this paper, we use real-time nationally representative survey data from
the UK to answer these questions. We analyse the source of observed
inequalities in impacts of the pandemic by estimating the relationship between
employment outcomes and three occupational and industry characteristics:
physical proximity at the workplace, location flexibility of the job and industry
exposure to reduced demand. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper to quantify this relationship. We then compare the effects of the
UK’s Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and of an alternative relief
programme similar to the Economic Impact Payments in the US, taking into
account labour market disruption associated with occupational characteristics,
assortative partnering and differences in households’ assets. Our findings shed
important light on features of effective mitigation policy.
We document substantial variation in labour market outcomes across
workers. The likelihood of labour market disruption (being laid off or
furloughed) falls over the earnings and asset distributions. Less-educated
workers and those younger than 25 or older than 65 have also faced substantial
disruption. At the household level, the relationship between labour market
impacts and earnings is qualitatively similar to that at the individual level.
However, in the bottom fifth of the earnings distribution, 23 per cent of singles
are laid off while only 4 per cent of couples experience both partners being
laid off; in the majority of cases, at least one partner either works as usual
or is furloughed. This highlights the importance of partial insurance at the
household level.
To understand sources of inequalities in the impact of the pandemic, we
relate these outcomes to measures of physical proximity, flexibility to work
from home and industry exposure to reduced demand during the pandemic
across occupations and industries. Lower-earning workers are most likely
to be in industries with reduced demand, and also have least flexibility to
work remotely. This is the case too for lower-educated, the youngest and the
oldest workers. Females are more likely to have jobs requiring close physical
proximity than males. At the household level, exposure to reduced industry
demand falls in the top half of the earnings distribution, and work flexibility
rises substantially across both the earnings and asset distributions. These risks
are also highly correlated between spouses, particularly among low-income
households. This suggests that the occupational and industrial characteristics
are important determinants of labour market impacts across workers and
households.
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We quantify this relationship directly by estimating a probit model of
employment outcomes (either working, furloughed or separated from the
employer) on the physical proximity, location flexibility and industry exposure
of a worker’s job. We find that all three factors matter for the likelihood
of being laid off, but only location flexibility and industry exposure are
key predictors for being furloughed or working. This suggests that policy
supporting furloughed workers should target those with inflexible working
arrangements and those in the most exposed industries.
We then conduct a quantitative analysis of the impacts of COVID-19 on
incomes and spending. Using an expenditure imputation method adapted from
Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008), we show that, despite the support from
CJRS, the reduction in labour income leads to a shortfall between income and
expenditure for lower-income households. Among these households, 70 per
cent are unlikely to have sufficient assets to maintain expenditure for even one
week.1 Our findings imply that the labour market effects of the pandemic are
likely to widen inequalities in consumption and savings since lower-income
households: (1) experience a larger proportionate income reduction; (2) have
a smaller buffer between usual income and expenditure, and make smaller
savings during lockdown; and (3) hold insufficient liquid assets to sustain
expenditure. These facts explain why savings rates fell among low-income
households but rose among high-income households during the pandemic.2
Finally, we compare the effectiveness of the UK’s CJRS and of the very
different mitigation policy in the US. CJRS pays 80 per cent of pre-pandemic
earnings (up to a monthly cap) for furloughed workers.3 The US policy
instead provides a one-off payment to all tax-filing households. The size
of the payment reduces with pre-pandemic earnings and takes into account
household characteristics such as the number of children. We find that the
US-style payment would better enable households to maintain their usual
expenditure. This is because: (1) the payment has full coverage, while CJRS
does not cover laid-off workers; (2) the payment has a higher replacement rate
for low-income workers, unlike the flat 80 per cent rate of CJRS (up to a cap);
and (3) households with more children (which tend to have lower incomes) get
higher payments.4
This paper is closely related to work studying heterogeneity in
labour market exposure to lockdown measures. Much existing work uses
1Since the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) COVID module does not provide information
on current assets, we use information on household assets from UKHLS wave 8 (collected in 2016 and
2017).
2Haldane, 2020.
3The scheme has had substantial uptake, with over 30 per cent of the workforce supported by the scheme
by 31 May 2020 (HM Revenue and Customs, 2020).
4A key objective of CJRS was to keep workers with their existing employer. While it is not yet possible to
assess its effectiveness in achieving this objective, retaining employment relationships is likely to generate
longer-term benefits.
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occupational characteristics to study the possible effects of COVID-19 on
labour supply, focusing on income losses. Joyce and Xu (2020) and Blundell
et al. (2020) document the characteristics of workers employed in sectors
most likely to be affected by lockdown measures, based on pre-pandemic
employment patterns. Hicks, Faulk and Devaraj (2020) study the physical
proximity of occupations and Dingel and Neiman (2020) analyse work
location flexibility, while Lekfuangfu et al. (2020) and Mongey, Pilossoph and
Weinberg (2020) consider the interaction between these two factors. Del Rio-
Chanona et al. (2020) provide a quantitative prediction of both supply and
demand across wage levels.5 However, the relationship between these ordinal
indices of occupational characteristics and labour market disruption remains
unstudied, making it difficult to understand policy implications.
Our paper is also related to literature documenting the impacts of lockdown
measures in the UK. Delestre et al. (2020) use data on users of the Money
Dashboard budgeting app to document impacts on income and spending,
while Benzeval et al. (2020) use data from the UK Household Longitudinal
Study (UKHLS) to document heterogeneity in the impacts. Adams-Prassl et al.
(2020a) use survey data collected in early April to compare labour market
impacts between the UK, the US and Germany.
We contribute to these literatures in four ways. First, we provide new
empirical evidence on heterogeneity in labour market impacts of the pandemic,
using nationally representative survey data from the UKHLS. In addition
to the characteristics studied by Benzeval et al. (2020), we analyse impact
differentials across the household asset distribution, and also consider the
correlation in impacts between household members – both key determinants
of households’ ability to self-insure against the disruption. Second, this is
the first paper to quantify the relationship between labour market outcomes
and indices of occupational and industrial characteristics. Third, we analyse
the implications of the pandemic for spending in addition to income for a
nationally representative sample, as this may better reflect the true impact on
household welfare.6 Our findings can explain the inverse relationship between
changes in savings rates and households’ incomes in Haldane (2020). Finally,
we provide a comparative assessment of flagship policies implemented in the
UK and the US to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic.
Additionally, our paper is related to the literature on household risk sharing
and consumption.7 These papers highlight the role of family labour supply
as partial insurance for consumption against income shocks. We show that
couples are less affected by the pandemic than singles. This is because
5Their measure of demand shocks is based on pre-COVID-19 estimates from an influenza pandemic.
6Poterba, 1989; Cutler and Katz, 1992.
7For example, Attanasio et al. (2002), Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) and Heathcote, Storesletten
and Violante (2014).
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correlation in the earnings shocks between partners is imperfect, providing
for some partial insurance. However, the correlation between partners’ labour
market risks is highest for lower-income households, making them least able
to self-insure.
Overall, this paper highlights the importance of differences in households’
ability to cushion negative income shocks and sheds light on features of
effective pandemic-mitigation policy. Our results suggest that, to effectively
reduce the negative and uneven consequences of COVID-19 on household
welfare, it is important to provide short-term liquidity (as the most affected
households also have the lowest means to smooth consumption) and, in the
longer term, provide a combination of income and employment support to
workers with least flexibility to work from home and in industries with most
reduced demand. This is particularly the case as affected workers tend to be
young – losing the opportunity to accumulate human and social capitals at
work could have long-term consequences for lifetime earnings.
II. Data overview
Our main data are drawn from the UK Household Longitudinal Study, a
nationally representative longitudinal survey of individuals in the UK. We
focus on the most recent wave (wave 9), collected in 2017 and 2018, and merge
in detailed data on assets from a specialist survey module administered during
wave 8 in 2016 and 2017. We use additional information on labour market
outcomes during the pandemic from the first UKHLS supplemental COVID-
19 module (collected at the end of April 2020).
We focus on individuals who were working and over the age of 16 at
the time of their wave 9 interview. We define occupations using the three-
digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code of their main job, and
similarly define industries using top-level Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) codes. We define earnings as net labour income in the month before
the individual was interviewed in wave 9;8 then we define total income, which
adds to earnings any benefit or other income. Finally, we construct liquid assets
as the sum of savings and any funds held in investment accounts in UKHLS
wave 8.
The UKHLS data also include household expenditure on a small set of
essential items in 2017 and 2018. To provide a more complete picture of
household spending, we impute total household expenditure using detailed
data on household spending drawn from the 2017–18 Living Costs and Food
Survey (LCFS). We use a similar procedure to that in Blundell, Pistaferri and
Preston (2008) by first estimating the demand for food (an expenditure item
8This includes usual pay from their main job, pay from any second jobs, and profits (or losses) from
self-employment.
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available in both UKHLS and LCFS) as a function of total expenditure and
household characteristics, and then inverting the estimated system to impute
total expenditure for UKHLS sample members.
We drop workers who did not provide data on assets in wave 8 or have
missing information about industry exposure. Our sample contains 13,225
residents in 9,639 households. We provide details on our data, including the
expenditure imputation procedure, in Appendix A, available online.
III. Labour market impacts of COVID-19
The pandemic has disrupted labour markets along multiple dimensions. Given
worker heterogeneity across occupations and industries, the impacts are likely
to be uneven. In this section, we start by examining labour market outcomes
at the individual and household levels. We then analyse the drivers of labour
market outcomes. We relate outcomes to three labour market risks using a
probit model. The first two – physical proximity and location flexibility – may
lead to labour supply disruption.9 The third measure is associated with reduced
labour demand. We find a clear relationship between these risks and labour
market outcomes.
1. Labour market outcomes
We use data from the UKHLS COVID-19 module to study the labour market
impacts of the pandemic. In addition to labour market status in April 2020,
respondents provided their ‘baseline’ employment status in February 2020.
We focus on people working at the baseline and identify those who, in April,
were either working, furloughed on the CJRS or no longer employed.
Figure 1 shows these outcomes across workers’ time-invariant charac-
teristics. Panel a categorises by ethnicity on the left and by gender and
education on the right. Black people are most likely to have kept their jobs
(75 per cent) and least likely to have been laid off (8.1 per cent). Asian
people are half as likely to be furloughed as other ethnicities (11 per cent
versus around 20 per cent). However, Asian and mixed-race people are over
twice as likely as black people to be laid off. In the right panel, we show
that low-educated workers are more adversely affected than high-educated
workers.
Panel b plots the outcomes by location (left side) and age (right side).
Workers in London are least likely to have experienced labour market
disruption, while those in the Midlands, Wales and Northern Ireland are most
9These have been used as possible predictors of labour market impacts of COVID-19 in a number of
papers (although the relationship to outcomes remains unquantified) – for example, Dingel and Neiman
(2020) for the location flexibility factor and Hicks, Faulk and Devaraj (2020) for the physical proximity
factor.
© 2020 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
Income and consumption effects of COVID-19 and the role of public policy 811
FIGURE 1
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Household head's labour earnings quintile
Both working Working and furloughed Both furloughed

































1 2 3 4 5
Individual's asset quintile
working furloughed separated
(a) Ethnicity (left) and gender–education (right)
(b) Location (left) and age group (right)
(c) Earnings (left) and assets (right)
(d) Singles (left) and couples (right)
Note: High education is defined as having a university degree or higher. Panels a−c include employed
workers in the baseline period of the COVID-19 supplementary sample. The right side of Panel d includes
households with partners living together. Household head is defined as the higher-earning partner, and
the household head’s labour earnings quintile is calculated from the unconditional individual earnings
distribution, comparable to the individual-level labour income quintiles in Panel c.
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disrupted. There are polarised impacts across ages. The youngest (under 25
years) and the oldest (65 years and over) are the most likely to experience
labour market disruption. The disproportionate impact on young people is
consistent with Costa Dias, Joyce and Norris Keiller (2020), who note the
potentially severe impacts on long-term career prospects.
Panel c shows the outcomes by individuals’ earnings (left) and assets
(right). Lower-earning workers are much more affected than those with higher
earnings. And workers with lower assets are also more likely to be disrupted.
Finally, Panel d shows the distribution of impacts at the household level by
the earnings quintile of household heads, focusing on singles on the left
and couples on the right.10 The relationship between labour market risk and
earnings is qualitatively similar at the household level to that at the individual
level. However, while 23 per cent of singles in the bottom fifth of the earnings
distribution are laid off, both partners are laid off in only 4 per cent of couples
in this quintile.
Overall, these plots provide evidence that workers at the bottom of both the
earnings and asset distributions are most affected by labour market disruption
caused by COVID-19, particularly singles who have no household-level risk
sharing. This is likely to have important implications for their ability to smooth
consumption. We return to this point in Section IV.
2. Sources of outcome differential
To analyse factors driving differences in labour market outcomes, we focus
on three sources of risk. We adopt the physical proximity and location
flexibility factors from Lekfuangfu et al. (2020), who construct these indices
from O*NET using factor analysis.11 The indices are continuous measures of
location flexibility (or ability to work from home) and physical proximity for
each of 900 detailed occupations, reflecting that these features are unlikely to
be binary (as also noted by Adams-Prassl et al. (2020b)). Our third measure is
an index of industry exposure based on the economic impact survey of the
Office for National Statistics (2020). We use the percentage of businesses
reporting to have temporarily closed in each industry, defined by its top-level
SIC code, as an indicator of industry exposure.12 The measures of all three
factors are standardised to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.13
We first motivate our focus on these three factors. Panels a–c of Figure 2
show how each of the risks varies across age groups, conditional on gender
and education. While there is limited variation in physical proximity by
age, industry exposure and location flexibility exhibit a U shape and an
10We designate the higher-earning member of a cohabiting couple as the household head.
11For more details, see Lekfuangfu et al. (2020) and Appendix B, which is available online.
12See Table C1 in Appendix C, available online. Due to some industries having an insufficient number
of firms responding to the ONS survey, this measure is available for only 12 of 21 top-level SIC codes,
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FIGURE 2
Work characteristics by gender and education
(a) Physical proximity by age group (b) Industry exposure by age group (c) Location flexibility by age group
(d) Physical proximity by labour income (e) Industry exposure by labour income (f) Location flexibility by labour income
(g) Physical proximity by liquid assets (h) Industry exposure by liquid assets (i) Location flexibility by liquid assets
Note: High education is defined as having a university degree or higher. Marker size reflects employment
counts relative to the unconditional individual earnings distribution (meaning that sizes are comparable
across subfigures). Sample includes all employed workers in the main UKHLS sample.
inverse-U shape, respectively. This implies that youngest and oldest workers
may be most adversely affected by the pandemic due to the inflexibility of
their jobs and demand disruption within their industries. And these undesirable
characteristics of jobs are also most prevalent among low-educated workers
across all age groups.
Panels d–f show the measures across earnings deciles. On the one hand,
physical proximity varies only modestly across the earnings distribution and
types of workers. On the other hand, location flexibility and industry exposure
vary substantially: lower-earning workers (particularly low-educated males)
are most likely to be in industries exposed to demand reductions and with
representing 82 per cent of the UK workforce. We have dropped individuals whose industry is missing from
the ONS survey from our analysis.
13Specifically, the measures have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across unweighted occupations and
industries.
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FIGURE 3
Within-household correlation between exposure measures
(a) Physical proximity by head’s
labour income
(b) Industry exposure by head’s
labour income
(c) Location flexibility by head’s
labour income
(d) Physical proximity by
liquid assets
(e) Industry exposure by
liquid assets
(f) Location flexibility by
liquid assets
Note: The figure shows the correlation between partners’ values of each exposure measure (left axis) and
score of the exposure measure for the household head (right axis). Household head is defined as the higher-
earning partner. Marker size reflects the number of household heads in each decile of the unconditional
individual earnings distribution (including singles and partners of heads). Sample includes all employed
spouses in the main UKHLS sample.
least flexibility to work remotely. This is consistent with patterns observed in
other countries.14 Finally, Panels g–i show the measures along the distribution
of liquid assets. Low-educated workers are most exposed to negative demand
shocks, and also have relatively low liquid assets (as indicated by the size of
markers).
Assortative partnering between people with similar education levels further
amplifies the unequal distribution of risks at the household level. Figure 3
shows the within-couple correlations of each factor (on the left vertical
axis), and the average score of the household head for a given factor (the
right vertical axis). The marker size in this figure represents the number of
household heads in each decile of the individual earnings distribution. Panels
a–c show spousal correlations by the household head’s earnings, and Panels
d–f show similar statistics along the distribution of household liquid assets.
While there is little difference in the average degree of physical proximity
across the household head’s earnings distribution, the average degree of
14For example, Mongey, Pilossoph and Weinberg (2020) for the US, Saltiel (2020) and Lekfuangfu et al.
(2020) for developing countries.
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work flexibility rises substantially in the top half of the distribution and the
average degree of industry exposure declines gradually in earnings. That is,
low-earnings households are more likely to experience unfavourable shocks
to labour supply and demand. Further, these risks are positively correlated
between spouses because they tend to work in similar occupations and
industries, particularly at the bottom end of the earnings distribution.
Additionally, Panels d–f of Figure 3 show that the average degree of the
household head’s physical proximity does not vary much by the household’s
liquid assets. However, the degree of industry exposure is slightly declining
in the household’s assets, with a higher positive correlation among spouses
in wealthy families. The degree of work flexibility of the household head
is substantially lower at the bottom end of the asset distribution and it is
more correlated between spouses than the other measures. Overall, these plots
demonstrate that households at the bottom of both the earnings and asset
distributions are most exposed to labour market risks.
To quantify the effects of these risks, we estimate the probability of three
labour market outcomes – working as usual, being furloughed and not working
– as a function of the three risks using a multinomial probit model.15 For each
of the three labour market outcomes, we write
yi j = α j fi + βxi + ξi j,(1)
where j = {working, furloughed, separated}, yi j is the latent labour market
outcome variable of worker i, fi is a vector containing the three factors and
their interactions based on the individual’s occupation and industry in the pre-
pandemic period, xi contains individual i’s characteristics such as age, and
ξi j
iid∼ N(0, 1) is an idiosyncratic shock.
Table 1 reports the estimated marginal effects of each factor, holding other
variables at their means. The marginal effects are robust across specifications.
On average, a 1-unit increase in physical proximity increases the probability of
being laid off by around 4 percentage points, but has no statistically significant
impact on the probability of being furloughed. By contrast, a 1-unit increase
in location flexibility reduces the lay-off probability by around 5.5 percentage
points and the furlough probability by around 3 percentage points. Finally, a
1-unit increase in industry exposure increases the lay-off probability by around
2 percentage points, but increases the furlough probability by 7 to 8 percentage
points.16 Overall, workers with least location flexibility, in jobs requiring high
physical proximity and in industries with most reduced demand are most likely
15The net benefits of the employment outcomes to firms may not have global ordering. Therefore, we
consider a multinomial probit to be more appropriate than an ordered probit model.
16We plot the distribution of these marginal effects for model 3 in Figure D1 in Appendix D, available
online.
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TABLE 1
Marginal effects of indices on labour market outcomes
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Physical proximity
Working –0.0253 –0.0285 –0.0251 –0.0255 –0.0248
(–1.47) (–1.62) (–1.42) (–1.45) (–1.40)
Furlough –0.0200 –0.0128 –0.0131 –0.0140 –0.0156
(–1.42) (–0.89) (–0.91) (–0.98) (–1.07)
Laid off 0.0452*** 0.0413*** 0.0382** 0.0395** 0.0404***
(3.92) (3.45) (3.20) (3.25) (3.35)
Industry exposure
Working –0.0987*** –0.0930*** –0.0900*** –0.0894*** –0.0907***
(–7.83) (–7.36) (–7.16) (–7.20) (–7.31)
Furlough 0.0775*** 0.0722*** 0.0704*** 0.0707*** 0.0702***
(7.75) (7.23) (7.09) (7.18) (7.09)
Laid off 0.0211* 0.0208* 0.0195* 0.0187* 0.0205*
(2.48) (2.42) (2.33) (2.19) (2.51)
Location flexibility
Working 0.111*** 0.0882*** 0.0848*** 0.0843*** 0.0783***
(7.15) (5.40) (5.18) (5.16) (4.77)
Furlough –0.0565*** –0.0327* –0.0309* –0.0314* –0.0273*
(–4.34) (–2.37) (–2.25) (–2.28) (–1.97)
Laid off –0.0542*** –0.0555*** –0.0538*** –0.0529*** –0.0510***
(–5.05) (–4.95) (–4.78) (–4.72) (–4.53)
Controls
Gender ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Education ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Age and age squared ✓ ✓ ✓
Regional dummy ✓ ✓
Ethnicity ✓
Sample size 3,258 3,258 3,258 3,258 3,229
AIC 4,894.7 4,852.6 4,827.4 4,839.6 4,770.4
BIC 4,992.1 4,974.3 4,973.5 5,131.8 5,098.7
Note: The table shows marginal effects at means. z-scores are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * signify
p-value <0.01, p-value <0.05 and p-value <0.1, respectively. AIC and BIC refer to Akaike and Bayes
Information Criteria. Sample includes employed workers in the baseline period of UKHLS COVID-19
module.
to experience labour market disruption during the pandemic. Policy aimed at
mitigating the impacts on incomes should therefore target these workers.
IV. Effects on income and spending
We now consider the consequences of the labour market risks for households’
income and spending. To quantify these effects, we first calculate the expected
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income of each individual in a household during the pandemic, based on
the estimated probabilities of labour market disruption.17 For each individual




Pr (working) × ypre
) + (Pr (furloughed) × yf )
+ (Pr (separated) × ys) ,(2)
where ypre is earnings in the pre-pandemic period, y f is earnings if furloughed
and ys is earnings if separated.18 In this section, we first examine the effects
of the pandemic on household income across the income distribution. We then
consider the extent to which reduced income affects households’ ability to
meet their expenditure requirements. Finally, we discuss households’ ability
to maintain expenditure using liquid assets.
1. Income
We assume that the earnings of individuals who continue working are
unchanged compared with the pre-crisis period, ypre, as measured in wave 9 of
UKHLS during 2017 or 2018. Earnings of separated workers, ys, fall to zero,
and earnings of furloughed workers, y f , are supported by the CJRS, under
which the government pays 80 per cent of their usual earnings up to a cap of
£2,500 a month before taxes (around £2,000 net). We then define total income
as earnings plus other incomes. For couples, total household income is the
sum of each individual’s total income.19 We allow for increases to universal
credit – the main benefit supporting unemployed or low-income households
– if earnings fall. To reflect the typical minimum wait between claiming and
receiving universal credit, we assume that households only receive additional
payments after five weeks. We hold all other unearned income an individual
received in 2017–18 fixed.
We show the impact of COVID-19 on household income for couples in
Panel a and for singles in Panel b of Figure 4. Within each income quintile,
the left-most bars show median monthly household income per person before
the pandemic across quintiles of the income distribution; the middle bars
show expected household income during the pandemic before adjustments to
universal credit; and the right-most bars include any increased universal credit.
For both couples and singles, the absolute reduction in per-person household
17We select model 3 from Table 1 as our preferred specification, based on its AIC and BIC.
18This approach allows us to include the full UKHLS wave 9 sample in our analysis, rather than the
subset of people who responded to the COVID-19 module.
19We drop households containing non-family members as they may not share resources within
households and we exclude children’s earnings from household income.
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Pre-Covid Lockdown Lockdown (w/ UC)
(a) Couples (b) Singles
Note: Panel a shows median per-person net household total income for couples in each quintile of the
(per-person) household income distribution. Panel b shows the same statistics for singles.
income is larger for higher-earning households. However, the proportionate
reduction in income is highest for low-income households before adjustments
to universal credit. For couples, median per-person household income falls by
17 per cent in the bottom earnings quintile compared with 13 per cent in the
top; similarly, the reduction is 22 per cent for singles in the bottom quintile
and 15 per cent for those in the top. This highlights that the labour market
impacts of the pandemic fall disproportionately on low-income households.
And, while universal credit mitigates these unequal income effects, we show
in the next subsection that there remains inequality in the ability of households
to absorb reduced income.
2. Expenditure
We now consider the effect of these income reductions on households’ ability
to finance expenditure where households’ expenditures are imputed using
Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008)’s technique.20 We present the expected
gap between income and expenditure for couples in Panel a and for singles
in Panel b of Figure 5.21 In these panels, we show ‘short-term’ income–
expenditure gaps per household member, before any additional support from
universal credit.22 Within each quintile, the left-most bars show the median gap
20Expenditure includes all types of spending, reflecting that a household may have financial
commitments in addition to spending on consumption items.
21We note also that, while producing consistent estimates, our imputation procedure is likely to introduce
measurement error into the expenditure data. To mitigate the impact on our conclusions of outliers arising
from measurement error, in this section we focus on median income–expenditure gaps.
22The deficits become slightly smaller when we include universal credit (see Figure D3 in Appendix D,
available online), but remain larger than before the pandemic.
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Lowest income 2 3 4 Highest income
Pre-Covid Lockdown, full exp.
Lockdown, cut exp.
(a) Couples (b) Singles
Note: Panel a shows the median gap between income and expenditure (per person) for couples, both in the
pre-COVID period and under the two scenarios described in the text. Panel b shows the same statistics for
singles.
before the pandemic. This is increasing in household income, suggesting that
higher-income households are better able to absorb a reduction in income.23
The middle bars show the expected income–expenditure gaps during the
pandemic. For couples, the reduction in income increases the pre-existing
income–expenditure deficit for those in the bottom quintile, and reduces the
income–expenditure surplus over the rest of the distribution (although the gaps
remain positive). For singles, the pre-existing income–expenditure deficits
increase in the bottom 40 per cent. Therefore, despite the support from the
CJRS, the labour market impacts of the pandemic jeopardise the ability of the
lowest-income households to afford their usual spending, and the effects are
particularly severe for singles.
However, as a result of increased restrictions, household spending may
have fallen during the pandemic. We construct a second measure of total
expenditure that reduces spending on categories for which spending is likely
to have fallen as a result of lockdown measures.24 We show the gap between
household income during the pandemic and this reduced expenditure in the
right-most bars within each quintile of Figure 5. The income–expenditure
gap returns to around the pre-pandemic level for couples and singles in the
bottom 20 per cent of the income distribution, but reduced spending fails
23We also note that the pre-pandemic income–expenditure gap is negative for lower-income households.
The observation that median household income exceeds expenditure for the lowest-income households is
consistent with other studies – for example, Brewer, Goodman and Leicester (2006) for Britain and Pew
Charitable Trusts (2016) for the US.
24We exclude any spending on restaurants, hotels and leisure activities, and reduce spending on transport
by 80 per cent reflecting that, across modes, transport use fell by between 70 per cent (for car travel) and 95
per cent (for rail travel) (Cabinet Office, 2020).
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to compensate reduced income for other groups. We note, however, that
higher-income households make larger savings on usual expenditure during
the pandemic since they usually spend more on expenditure items likely to be
unavailable.
3. Using assets to maintain expenditure
We now analyse the extent to which the households whose income–
expenditure gap becomes negative (or more negative) have sufficient savings
to maintain spending.25 We consider the three groups whose median income–
expenditure gap becomes more negative as a result of the pandemic: couples
in the bottom quintile of the earnings distribution, and singles in the first
two quintiles. We calculate the number of weeks each household in these
groups could finance the increase in the median gap based on pre-pandemic
expenditure using their liquid assets.26
We incorporate an increase in income from universal credit after five weeks,
reflecting the typical minimum wait between claiming and receiving universal
credit. We focus attention on the number of households able to finance the
median income–expenditure gap from liquid assets for (a) less than one week,
(b) less than five weeks, (c) less than twelve weeks and (d) twelve weeks or
more. Households in categories (a) and (b) are of particular policy interest,
as these highly constrained households may not be able to sustain spending
until receiving any increased benefit entitlement. We show the proportions of
households in each of these categories in Figure 6.
Based on the most recently available asset data for individuals in our
sample, collected in UKHLS wave 8, a substantial fraction of households
are unlikely to have sufficient liquid assets to finance the median income–
expenditure gap for even one week. This is true across all three groups. For
couples in the bottom quintile of the income distribution, around 78 per cent
would be unable to maintain expenditure for the five weeks before receiving
any increased benefit payments. The equivalent figures are 70 per cent and
73 per cent for singles in the first and second quintiles. This underlines that
a substantial fraction of the households whose income falls below their usual
expenditure are likely to need to reduce spending as a result.
In summary, the labour market effects of the pandemic are likely to widen
inequalities in consumption and savings since lower-income households:
25We summarise the distribution of liquid assets across income quintiles, separately for couples and
singles, in Figure A1 in Appendix A, available online.
26We take the median income–expenditure gaps based on pre-pandemic expenditure as a reference
point for each income group, instead of the reduced lockdown expenditure, as the latter may understate
households’ actual expenditure needs: it simply removes some items without allowing households to
substitute this consumption into other categories. While modelling consumption responses (which could
depend on households’ incomes, beliefs and preferences) would be an interesting extension, it is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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FIGURE 6





















< 1 week 1-5 weeks
5-12 weeks ≥ 12 weeks
Note: The figure shows, for households in income quintiles with a negative median income–expenditure
gap in our scenario, the lengths of time they could afford to maintain pre-pandemic expenditure by using
liquid assets. Specifically, it shows the distribution of households’ liquid assets divided by the median
income–expenditure gap for their income quintile and status as a couple or single, defined using the
pre-pandemic expenditure measure (i.e. the middle bars in Figure 5). For groups with a negative median
income–expenditure gap before the pandemic, we instead divide liquid assets by the increase in the income–
expenditure gap (i.e. the difference between the middle and left-most bars in Figure 5).
(1) experience a larger proportionate income reduction because of the types of
jobs they do; (2) have a smaller buffer between usual income and expenditure,
and make smaller savings during lockdown; and (3) do not hold sufficient
assets to sustain expenditure. These results explain why savings rates fell
among low-income households, but rose among high-income households,
during the pandemic in the UK.27
V. Alternative policy response
1. US-style economic impact payments
In this section, we consider an alternative scheme, based on the Economic
Impact Payments (EIPs) in the US. EIPs provide a one-off payment to all
27Haldane, 2020.
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households that file a tax return, up to a maximum of $1,200 for each adult
household member and $500 for every child. The payments are reduced at
a rate of $5 for every $100 earned above a threshold which depends on
household structure.
This policy has a number of important differences from the CJRS. First, the
payments are a one-off transfer rather than a recurring earnings replacement.
The generosity of the EIPs therefore falls over time. Second, the EIPs are
available to all households, whereas CJRS is only available to furloughed
workers – not those continuing to work, nor those who are laid off. Finally,
the lowest-income households are entitled to the highest EIP, unlike the 80 per
cent replacement rate (up to a monthly cap) under CJRS.
We study the likely effects of an EIP-style payment in the UK. We set
the maximum payment to £593 per adult and £247 per child. These amounts
are equal to 1.0 and 0.4 times average weekly household expenditure in the
UK, the same level as the EIPs relative to average household spending in the
US.28 We then reduce the payments by 5 pence for every pound of gross
household labour income above £4,031 a month for couples and £1,916 a
month for singles. These thresholds are the 60th percentile of the household
income distributions for couples and singles in our sample, corresponding to
the approximate location of the EIP thresholds in the US income distribution.
Unlike the CJRS, EIPs do not provide firms with assistance in retaining
workers.29 In the absence of CJRS, it is likely that some furloughed workers
would have lost their jobs. We consider three scenarios intended to capture the
full range of potential outcomes: (1) all furloughed workers would have instead
been laid off; (2) furloughed workers would have either separated from their
employer or continued to work, with equal probability; and (3) all furloughed
workers would have continued to work. These represent worst-, mid- and best-
case scenarios for the counterfactual outcomes of furloughed workers in the
absence of CJRS.
2. Comparison between US- and UK-style support
In Table 2, we show the impacts of the policies on households’ ability to
maintain expenditure. We also consider a ‘no policy’ scenario, in which the
labour market impacts are identical to the worst-case EIP scenario but workers
receive no additional support from the government. Across all scenarios,
28US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019.
29There is a small Employee Retention Credit available in the US, providing a credit of 50 per cent of
wages paid up to $10,000 from March to December 2020. However, the scheme is less generous than the
UK’s CJRS – particularly as it requires employers to continue paying wages.
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TABLE 2












Panel A. Maintain expenditure with liquid assets
<1 week 18.2% 15.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
1–5 weeks 2.9% 1.1% 0.2% 1.3% 4.0%
5–12 weeks 1.8% 1.5% 1.5% 5.5% 4.7%
≥12 weeks 14.6% 15.5% 29.8% 28.0% 27.7%
No expenditure gap 62.4% 65.9% 68.4% 65.1% 63.4%
Panel B. Average expenditure per individual (pre-COVID mean = £1,652)
After 1 week £1,593 £1,623 £1,652 £1,652 £1,651
After 5 weeks £1,603 £1,629 £1,651 £1,644 £1,629
After 12 weeks £1,595 £1,623 £1,647 £1,627 £1,611
Panel C. Income gradient of expenditure reduction
After 1 week –1.987 –0.810 –0.007 –0.013 0.028
(0.384) (0.174) (0.001) (0.002) (0.020)
After 5 weeks –0.603 –0.330 0.047 0.270 0.559
(0.264) (0.133) (0.010) (0.094) (0.195)
After 12 weeks –0.444 –0.142 0.158 0.437 0.651
(0.280) (0.147) (0.062) (0.174) (0.248)
Panel D. Cost per household
After 1 week £0 £100 £913 £913 £913
After 5 weeks £0 £499 £913 £913 £913
After 12 weeks £0 £1,198 £913 £913 £913
Note: The table compares the effects of various policy options on households’ ability to maintain
expenditure during the COVID-19 pandemic. In each column, we consider a scenario in which the labour
market disruption a worker faces depends on their estimated probabilities of continuing to work, being
furloughed or separating from their employer. In all five columns, we assume workers also receive support
from the UK welfare system after five weeks. See the text for details. The numbers in parentheses in Panel
C are standard errors.
households may also become entitled to additional support from universal
credit after five weeks.30
In Panel A of Table 2, we show the fraction of households that can sustain
pre-pandemic expenditure using liquid assets for different lengths of time.
With no policy intervention, 62 per cent of households would retain income
30In response to the pandemic, the UK government introduced a system of universal credit ‘advances’
designed to reduce this wait period. However, less than two in five new claimants in March, April and May
received an advance payment (Department for Work and Pensions, 2020).
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above their usual expenditure. However, over 18 per cent would need to cut
expenditure within one week.
CJRS partially mitigates the adverse effects. The fraction of households
able to sustain expenditure indefinitely increases to 66 per cent and the fraction
needing to cut spending within one week falls to 16 per cent. However, the
EIP-style scheme is much more effective at supporting expenditure in the short
term, reducing the fraction of households unable to sustain expenditure for one
week to almost zero across all three scenarios. This highlights the severity of
liquidity constraints for the households most affected by the pandemic, which
the EIP is effective at relaxing.
In Panel B, we consider the effects of the policies on average total
expenditure per household member. We assume that households reduce
expenditure if (a) their income falls below pre-pandemic expenditure (or any
pre-existing income–expenditure deficit increases) and (b) their assets are
insufficient to finance the shortfall for one, five or twelve weeks. We also report
pre-pandemic average expenditure of £1,652 per household member.
While both CJRS and EIP mitigate the reduction, the EIP is more
effective, at least in the short term. The worst-case EIP scenario generates
the same average expenditure reduction as CJRS after five weeks. In the best-
case scenario, expenditure is barely affected. This highlights the potentially
substantial short-term benefits of providing constrained households with
liquidity. However, over longer time horizons, the continued support provided
by the UK’s CJRS becomes increasingly beneficial: by 12 weeks, the
expenditure reduction under CJRS is similar to that of the mid-case EIP.
In Panel C, we assess how each policy affects the pattern of expenditure
reductions over the income distribution. We report the estimated coefficient
from a linear regression of the percentage reduction in household spending on
pre-pandemic household income (expressed in logs).31 A negative coefficient
indicates that the percentage expenditure reduction is smaller for higher-
income households, while a positive coefficient indicates the opposite. Across
all scenarios, the gradients become less negative (or more positive) over time.
This reflects that the very short-term effects on expenditure are concentrated
on the lowest-income households because they have less of a buffer. And, at
every point in time, CJRS mitigates the income gradient of expenditure effects
compared with the no-policy scenario.
However, the EIP is more effective at eliminating the relationship between
household income and the effect on expenditure. In fact, by five and
twelve weeks, the estimated relationship between expenditure reductions and
household income is positive. There are three main reasons for this. First, the
EIP is highest for low-income households; by contrast, CJRS pays a fixed
proportion of earnings (up to a cap). Second, EIPs depend on household
31We include all households in our sample, including those with no required spending reduction.
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structure (including number of children), which is related to household income
(see Figure D2 in Appendix D, available online). Finally, all households are
entitled to receive the EIP, including those with laid-off workers, unlike CJRS.
In Panel D of Table 2, we consider the cost per household of the CJRS and
EIP payments. The cost of CJRS per household is higher than the cost of EIP
by 12 weeks. But, despite its cost, it does not perform substantially better at
supporting expenditure over this period. However, we note that the net benefits
of CJRS relative to EIP would depend on the duration of the programme and
whether it has longer-term benefits in helping workers retain their jobs.
VI. Conclusion
This paper assesses the implications of the labour market disruption caused by
COVID-19 for households in the UK. Workers with already low labour force
attachment, such as those with lower education, are most adversely affected.
The impacts are also concentrated on households at the bottom of the earnings
and asset distributions. We provide evidence that occupational and industrial
characteristics explain inequalities in earnings risk. These characteristics
capture the impact of the pandemic on both labour supply (as measured by
flexibility to work from home) and labour demand.
We then consider the consequences of this differential exposure for
incomes and expenditure. Lower-income households experience the largest
proportionate income reduction. This, along with a smaller buffer between
usual income and expenditure, contributes to a shortfall between income and
required expenditure for lower-income households, but not for higher-income
households. Moreover, inequality in liquid wealth exacerbates inequality in
the transmission of the income shocks to expenditure. More than two-thirds
of households in the bottom fifth of the income distribution have insufficient
assets to maintain expenditure for even one week. Finally, we compare the
relative effectiveness of the UK’s CJRS and the US’s EIPs. We find that the
EIP would have been substantially better at helping households in the UK to
maintain their usual expenditure in the short term.
Overall, this paper highlights important differences in households’ abilities
to cushion negative income shocks. To effectively reduce the negative and
uneven consequences of COVID-19 for household welfare, it is crucial to
both provide short-term liquidity (as the most affected households also have
the lowest means to smooth expenditure) and, in the longer term, provide
a combination of income and employment support to those with the lowest
ability to work remotely and those in industries with most reduced demand.
This is particularly the case as affected workers tend to be young – for these
workers, losing the opportunity to accumulate human and social capitals at
work could have long-term consequences for lifetime earnings.
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Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article.
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